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The End of Peremptory Challenges:
A Call for Change Through
Comparative Analysis
ByAMY WILSON*
I. Introduction
Although the peremptory challenge system has been a part of the
American legal landscape since 1790,' it has not gone without
criticism. In his concurring opinion in Batson v. Kentucky, Justice
Marshall denounced peremptory challenges altogether. He
summarized the futility of the current United States approach to
ending discrimination in jury selection. Marshall astutely stated that
"[m]erely allowing defendants the opportunity to challenge the
racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in individual
cases will not end the illegitimate use of the peremptory challenge. '
Justice Marshall stated simply that the goal of ending discrimination
altogether "can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory
challenges entirely."3
The United States Supreme Court has limited the use of
peremptory challenges when it comes to discrimination of protected
classes. However, inherent in the United States practice of jury
selection is the widespread use of stereotyping and discrimination.!
This paper will propose that peremptory challenges be abolished in
* J.D. candidate, May 2009, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
The author would like to thank Professors Kate Bloch and Aaron Rappaport for
opening her eyes up to the reality of the peremptory challenge practice in the United
States, and her friends and family for their love and support.
1. Law of April 30, 1790, c. 10, § 30, 1 Stat. 119 (1790).
2. 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986).
3. Id. at 103.
4. See id. at 105; see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 537 U.S. 322, 346 (2003); J.E.B. v.
Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 131 (1994).
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the United States by analyzing the history of their use in the United
Kingdom including the complete abolition of their use there.
II. History of Peremptory Challenges in England
Peremptory challenges in the United States grew out of the
English common law system! Therefore, a look into how the practice
has evolved in England is of paramount importance. The first use of
the peremptory challenge in England was by prosecutors during
capital criminal cases between the years of 1250 and 1300.6 One
scholar, Paul H. Schwartz, explains that as jurors became more like
fact-finders instead of their previous role as "fact-knowers," their
impartiality became increasingly more important.7  Schwartz
theorized that the use of peremptory challenges "evolved as one
safeguard of jury impartiality."8  In the beginning of its practice,
prosecutors could use their discretion to remove as many jurors as
they saw fit.9 Eventually, English defense counsel was allowed the
use of peremptory challenges in order to level the playing field."
However, during the early years of the peremptory challenge, the
defense was restricted to thirty-five challenges while the prosecution
was still allowed an unlimited number."
In 1305 in England, the use of peremptory challenges by the
prosecution was abolished." However, prosecutors were left with the
option to "stand aside" certain jurors. 13 Standing aside a juror meant
that the prosecutor was allowed to direct any number of potential
jurors to go to the end of the line of jurors without having to
articulate any reason. If enough potential jurors were excused
making it so those potential jurors who were stood aside became the
front of the line, they would be told to serve as jurors.
Eventually Parliament began to reduce the number of
peremptory challenges available to the defense until it completely
5. J. Shontavia Jackson, Peremptory Challenge: Striking Down Discrimination
in Arkansas's Jury Selection Process, 59 ARK. L. REv. 93, 98 (2006).
6. Id.
7. Paul H. Schwartz, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The Implementation of
Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 69 N.C.L. REv. 1533, 1536 (1991).
8. Id.
9. Jackson, supra note 5, at 98.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id
13. Id at 99.
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abolished the practice in 1989." The notes following the Criminal
Justice Act of 1988's abolition of peremptory challenges explain that
this was the final stage in a long process reducing the availability of
peremptory challenges over hundreds of years.5  In addition to
abolishing peremptory challenges, when the Criminal Justice Act of
1998 was being passed, the Attorney-General drafted guidelines on
the use of stand-asides and other times when individual would be
"manifestly unsuitable" for jury selection. 16 The Attorney-General's
guidelines explained that "[i]t is generally accepted that the
prosecution should not use its right in order to influence the overall
composition of a jury or with a view to tactical advantage.""
III. History of Peremptory Challenges in the United States
Nowhere in the Constitution, including Article III, Section 2's
description of the powers of the judicial branch and the creation of
the right to a jury in a criminal trial, does it specifically discuss the use
of peremptory challenges. 8  Additionally, there is no recorded
discussion during the Constitutional Convention or in the legislative
debates prior to the Bill of Rights or Civil Rights Amendments that
even mentions the right to peremptory challenges. 9
In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that there is no
Constitutional right to peremptory challenges in its opinion in Stilson
14. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 118 (Eng.).
15. General Note, Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 118 (Eng.).
16. Id.; see 1lso 1 Archbold: Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases
526-27 (P.J. Richardson et al. eds., Sweet and Maxwell 1992)(stating that "(5) the
circumstances in which it would be proper for the Crown to exercise its right to stand
by a member of a jury panel are: (a) where a jury check authorized in accordance
with the Attorney-General's Guidelines on Jury Checks reveals information
justifying exercise of the right to stand by . . . or (b) where a person is about to be
sworn as a juror who is manifestly unsuitable and the defense agree that, accordingly,
the exercise by the prosecution of the right to stand by would be appropriate").
17. 1 Archbold: Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases 526-27, supra
note 16 (stating that "[t]he enactment by Parliament of section 118 of the Criminal
Justice Act 1988 abolishing the right of defendants to remove jurors by means of
peremptory challenge makes it appropriate that the Crown should assert its right to
stand by old on the basis of clearly defined and restrictive criteria. Derogation from
the principle that members of a jury should be selected at random should be
permitted only where it is essential.").
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
19. William T. Pizzi and Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1391, 1414 (2001).
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v. United States." The Court in Stilson had the responsibility of
determining whether the trial court counting one peremptory
challenge against another defendant was a violation of the
Constitution.2' Stating that the lower court did not violate the
Constitution, the Court stated that "there is nothing in the
Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress to
grant peremptory challenges to defendants in criminal cases; trial by
an impartial jury is all that is secured. 2
Instead of being granted as a Constitutional right, a
Congressional bill in 1790 introduced peremptory challenges to the
United States federal jury selection process.23 The Act of 1790 first
granted twenty peremptory challenges to defendants in trials for
certain capital felonies and thirty-five peremptory challenges to
defendants in treason trials.24 Through time, the right to peremptory
challenges by defendants and the prosecution for crimes not covered
by the Act of 1790 became law through judicial decisions.25 By 1870,
almost all states granted both the defense and the prosecution the
discretion to use a specific number of peremptory challenges without
ever having to state a reason.26 For example, the California statute
regarding peremptory challenges states that a "challenge to an
individual juror may be taken orally or may be made in writing, but
no reason need be given for a peremptory challenge, and the court
shall exclude any juror challenged peremptorily., 27
The current version of the federal statute, Rule 24 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, states that both sides are entitled to a
certain number of peremptory challenges depending on the offense
being prosecuted.28 For example, both sides have the right to use
twenty peremptory challenges if the prosecution is seeking the death
penalty.29 On the other hand, in a felony case where the crime is
punishable by imprisonment of more than one year and the
20. Stilson v. U.S., 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
21. Id at 585.
22. Id. at 586.
23. Batson, 476 U.S. at 120.
24. Eric N. Einhorn, Note, Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama Ex. Rel.
T.B.: Is the Peremptory Challenge StillPreeminent, 36 B.C.L. REV. 161,167 (1994).
25. Id
26. Id.
27. CAL. Civ. PRO. § 226.
28. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
29. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(1).
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prosecution is not seeking the death penalty, the prosecution has the
potential to utilize six peremptory challenges and the defendant or
defendants jointly are allowed ten peremptory challenges. The court
may allow additional peremptory challenges when there are multiple
defendants and also may allow co-defendants to exercise challenges
jointly.'
Although Rule 24 provides guidance on how many challenges
can be made, it is silent on how and when they are to be used.
Instead, the specifics of the right to peremptory challenges including
when they are considered unconstitutionally discriminatory have
been discussed extensively in subsequent caselaw. The first Supreme
Court case discussing the right to peremptory challenges was Strauder
v. West Virginia." The Court in Strauderheld:
[i]n the composition or selection of jurors by whom an accused is to
be indicted or tried, persons of the accused's race or color may not
be excluded by law solely because of their race or color so that by
no Possibility can any person of the accused's race sit upon the
jury.
Simply put, Strauder was the first case to connect the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to the use of peremptory
challenges, creating a right to not be discriminated against based on
3
race during the jury selection process.
Although the Court in Strauder explained that using race as a
reason for a peremptory challenge was unconstitutional, the Court
did not articulate a workable standard.34 The Court merely stated
that peremptory challenges could not be used to create a situation
where there was no possibility for a defendant to have a juror of their
35
own race.
Next, in Swain v. Alabama, the Supreme Court explained that
peremptory challenges were justifiably discriminatory and could be
used to exclude "any group of otherwise qualified jurors in any given
case, whether they be Negroes, Catholics, accountants or those with
blue eyes."36 In Swain, an African-American man was convicted of
30. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
31. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
32. Id. at 305.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Swain, 380 U.S. 202,202 (1963).
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sexual assault in Alabama and sentenced to death.37 The jury that
convicted the defendant had no African-American jurors despite the
eligible jury pool being 26 percent black.38  The Court explained
simply that "[a]n imperfect system for the selection of juries is not
equivalent to purposeful discrimination based on race.""
In 1985, over a hundred years after the Supreme Court's decision
in Strauder, the Court in Batson v. Kentucky finally articulated a
standard.'n Batson was the first time a party actually invoked the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to challenge
peremptory challenges. 4' Defendant Batson, an African American,
was indicted by a grand jury for second-degree burglary and receipt
of stolen goods. During voir dire, the prosecutor struck the only
four African Americans on the panel.43 The all-white jury panel that
was eventually chosen convicted Batson on all charges." The Court
found that the use of peremptory challenges in that case violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.4 ' The standard that the court finally
articulated included a three-step test used to determine when a
defendant's constitutionally protected Equal Protection rights were
being violated.46
The first step in the Batson test requires the challenger to show a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.
Next, the Court shifts the burden onto the prosecution to give a
race neutral reason for the challenged juror strikes.4"
The Supreme Court later clarified the second part of the test in
Hernandez v. New York.49 The Court in Hernandez refused to find
that peremptory challenges that had a disparate impact on specific
racial groups would be invalid per se. The Court held that, "[a]
neutral explanation in the context of our analysis here means an
37. Swain, 380 U.S. 202, 203.
38. Id. at 205.
39. Id. at 209.
40. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 82.
43. Id. at 82-83.
44. Id. at 83.
45. Id at 98-100.
46. Id. at 93-95.
47. Id. at 93-94.
48. Id. at 94.
49. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
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explanation based on something other than the race of the juror...
the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. '"5 ° In
other words, unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race
neutral.
Last, according to the test from Batson, the trial judge decides
whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.5
Thereafter, the Supreme Court provided lower courts with
guidance on how to determine purposeful discrimination through its
decision in Miller-El v. Dretke12 In Miller-El, the Court directed
lower courts by stating that "a defendant may rely on 'all relevant
circumstances' to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination."53
In its opinion the Court emphasized the problem with
discriminatory peremptory challenges:
When the government's choice of jurors is tainted with racial bias,
that overt wrong casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the
jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial.
That is, the very integrity of the courts is jeopardized when a
prosecutor's discrimination invites cynicism respecting the jury's
neutrality, and undermines public confidence in adjudication. 1
Although, the Court refused to abolish peremptory challenges,
the Supreme Court has increasingly accepted its potential as a tool for
discrimination in the courtroom.55
Even after the series of cases limiting the use of peremptory
challenges, there are still certain unresolved issues surrounding their
use. In 1994, in J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Court extended the rule to
prohibit discrimination based on gender as well as racial
discrimination. 6 Additionally, California state courts are starting to
expand protection to sexual orientation discrimination as well.57 The
California Supreme Court in Rubio v. Superior Court held that a
defendant's constitutionally protected right to trial by a jury drawn
50. 500 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added).
51. 476 U.S. at 97.
52. 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
53. Id. at 240.
54. Id. at 238 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 410, 412 (1991) and Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992)).
55. See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 231.
56. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
57. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1269 (2000).
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from a cross section of the community is violated when any
"cognizable group" within that community is excluded from the jury
panel. 8 Then, in People v. Garcia, California Court of Appeals for
the Fourth District determined that lesbians and gay men met the two
requirements in Rubio regarding cognizable groups."
Some critics have argued that the extension of Batson into
gender and sexual orientation discrimination ostensibly kills the
peremptory challenge process by hindering it so extensively. Justice
Scalia's dissent in JE.B. urged the Court to stop expanding the
protected classes that could make Batson challenges.6° He explained
that the requirement for a facially neutral explanation by the
prosecution makes the peremptory lose its "whole character."'" Scalia
argued that the right of peremptory challenge is "an arbitrary and
capricious right; and it must be exercised with full freedom, or it fails
of its full purpose."62
Scholar Eric N. Einhorn, agreeing in part with Scalia's dissent in
J.E.B., argues that the current application of Batson takes attorney
credibility into consideration when they offer the race neutral
explanation instead of the real reason for the peremptory strike.63
Thus, according to Einhorn, the Supreme Court's holding in Batson is
little more than an "illusory protection." '
What Scalia and scholars like Einhorn have in common is their
criticism of Batson and its progeny, not the use of peremptory
challenge as an institution. Perhaps instead of criticizing the case law
that attempts to curb the discriminatory effects of peremptory
challenges, the solution may lie in the total abolition of the
peremptory challenge system.
IV. Reformation of the Peremptory Challenge System
Reformation of the peremptory challenge system is simply not
enough. Batson and its progeny raise some important questions
about the future of peremptory challenges. "Recent rulings on the
U.S. Supreme Court and appellate courts on the abuse of peremptory
58. 24 Cal. 3d 93, 97 (1979).
59. 77 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1276 (2000).
60. J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. at 161-62 (1994)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. Id at 162.
63. Einhorn, supra note 24, at 187.
64. Id.
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challenges recognize what trial judges and lawyers have always
known - that discrimination in selecting jurors has been practiced
systematically for decades, with the knowledge and acquiescence of
the courts." 65 The Supreme Court could continue to limit the types of
rationales allowed for striking potential jurors. Or, following the
guidance of Justice Marshall, the United States could abolish its use
altogether. After analyzing the abolition of the peremptory
challenges system in England, it seems that their abolition is a more
meaningful solution to discrimination in jury selection than merely
reforming the practice.
V. Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished
Just as they were abolished in England, peremptory challenges
should also be abolished in the United States. England abolished the
practice of peremptory challenges, through the Criminal Justice Act
of 1988, which took effect in 1989. In relevant part, it states simply
that, "[t]he right to challenge jurors without cause in proceedings for
the trial of a person on indictment is abolished." 66 Many of the
reasons why England abolished the use of peremptory challenges
mirror problems that are present in the United States today. The
successful abolition of peremptory challenges in England supports the
argument that peremptory challenges should also be permanently
removed from the United States jury selection processes.
A. Both English and American Jury Selection Systems Seek
Impartiality, but Both Are Plagued by Unequal
Representation and Bias
In the United States, as was true in England, peremptory
challenges do not require any expressed rationale and create an open
invitation for bias and unequal representation in jury selection.
Because of this characteristic of the peremptory challenge, scholars in
both countries expressed valid concerns about peremptory challenges
as a vehicle for discrimination. Those concerns have been reinforced
by realities of voir dire in the United States. In the United States,
"inequities in the jury system and in jury selection have challenged
65. H. Lee Sarokin & G. Thomas Munsterman, Recent Innovations in Civil Jury
Trial Procedures, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 378, 383 (Robert
E. Litan ed., 1993).
66. Einhorn, supra note 24, at 167.
2009]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the ideal of a representative jury and a fair trial by one's peers."67
Despite a requirement that jury be composed of one's peers, "racial
and ethnic minorities are consistently underrepresented in the vast
majority of both federal and state courts."68
Judge Robert A. Wenke's "The Art of Selecting a Jury"
expresses the reality of how peremptory challenges are used to skew
the jury towards the side exercising their right.69 The book explains
the results of a group of experienced trial attorneys rating which juror
characteristics matter the most in order of importance. According to
Judge Wenke, the top-ten list was as follows: (1) personal
characteristics, (2) occupation, (3) personality, (4) race, (5) physical
signs, (6) nationality, (7) body language, (8) sex, (9) age and (10)
marital status. "The Art of Selection a Jury" continues by explaining
that "[t]hese lawyers described the first four categories as 'extremely
important', the next five as important' and last, 'marital status,' as 'of
some consequence.""'7 In fact, the book devotes an entire chapter to
racial stereotypes and another to age, sex and marital status
71
stereotypes. Some of the advice from the book includes the
explanation that "[m]iddle aged and younger Blacks tend to believe
that the law and the police aren't always right," "Mexican-Americans
tend to be passive," and "[w]omen are more likely than men to vote
for the plaintiff.7 2  After Batson and its progeny, many of these
guidelines seem not only arbitrary, but some are unquestionably
outright unconstitutional.
It appears as though these types of abuse were the motivating
factors the English Parliament found to finally abolish the practice
altogether in 1988. For instance, in a 1982 interview study conducted
by Valerie P. Hans with English barristers from Cardiff, Wales, the
majority of the barristers surveyed "expressed the belief that the jury
should be drawn at random and stated that they rarely used their
67. US 90th Congress Senate Report No. 981 (1967) and US 90th Congress
Report No. 1076 (1968).
68. HIROSHI FUKURAI, EDGAR W. BUTLER, & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE AND
THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 3 (Springer,
1st ed. 1993)(citing H.R. Rep. No. 1076 (1968).
69. ROBERT A. WENKE, THE ART OF SELECTING A JURY 64-65 (Parker & Son,
Inc. 1979).
70. Id. at 64.
71. Id. at 76, 84.
72. Id.
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right to challenge."73  According to the Guardian newspaper in
London, "[t]he right of peremptory challenge was abolished in the
Criminal Justice Act 1988 on the ground that it was being abused by a
small number of London defence lawyers who used it to eliminate
intelligent jurors. 74  Defense counsel was seen as abusing the
peremptory challenge right in a series of criminal trials in the 1980s
that received a lot of publicity.75 The notes following the passage of
the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 state that the political movement to
abolish peremptory challenges came "following the acquittal of the
defendants in the 'Cyprus Secrets' trial (where defendants had
effectively pooled their peremptory challenges). 76 In the Cyprus spy
trial, the defense challenged seven jurors, and the entirely young,
male jury acquitted all seven defendants.77
The English Parliament refused to simply limit the rationales for
peremptory challenges, as is the case in the United States, opting
instead to remove them entirely. An article from the Guardian
perceptively asked, "if special rules were allowed for black
defendants, would not other minorities - homosexuals, Freemasons,
alcoholics, militant feminists - be able to argue that they too should
be given special treatment?"78 This is the type of question that should
be asked in the United States as well.
B. As in England, the Practice of Peremptory Challenges is not
Constitutionally Mandated and is in Fact Potentially
Unconstitutional in the United States
In his concurring opinion in Batson, Justice Marshall stated, "this
Court has also repeatedly stated that the right of peremptory
challenge is not of constitutional magnitude, and may be withheld
altogether without impairing the Constitutional guarantee of
impartial jury and fair trial."7 9 It has never been asserted that the right
73. Judith Heinz, Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Cases: A Comparison of
Regulation in The United States, England and Canada, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L. J. 201, 224 (1993)(citation omitted).
74. Michael Zander, Commentary.- In Search of Colour-Blind Justice, The
Guardian (London), Aug. 15, 1989.
75. Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should be Abolished: A Trial
Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809,822 (1997).
76. General Note, Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 118 (Eng.).
77. Sean Enright, Reviving the Challenge for Cause, 139 NEw L.J. 9 (1989).
78. Zander, supra note 74.
79. 476 U.S. at 108.
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to peremptory challenges is a constitutional one. On the contrary, it
can be argued that the practice is actually constitutionally prohibited.
Many scholars agree with the notion that if the per se
constitutionality of the practice were challenged, peremptory
challenges would be found to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
One scholar, David Zonana, explains that "[p]eremptory challenges
ensure the selection of jurors on the basis of insulting stereotypes
without substantially advancing the goal of making juries more
impartial." ° According to Zonana, the Equal Protection Clause does
not allow this type of arbitrary classification. Even Batson and
barring racial discrimination in peremptory challenges will not stop
the reality that the practice is inherently arbitrary. Zonana argues
that the Court "should have ruled that a procedure that decreases the
impartiality of juries, pigeonholes individuals in an insulting manner,
and excludes them from civic participation has no place in our court
system. ,s
1
Although England has no formal constitution, it has a
comparable history of equal rights protections and civil rights
legislation.82 As the United States deals with the consequences of
racial inequities through enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, England is avoiding the problems of
unequal representation and violations of civil rights laws through
total abolition of the peremptory procedure.
As the English jury pools became more heterogeneous, the juries
did not. Thus, the juries were not representative of the general
population and there was a need for some way to make the juries
more diverse. "[T]he institutional reason most commonly advanced
for the 1989 elimination of the English peremptory challenge was the
increasing diversity of the English venire, and the threat to that
diversity posed by the peremptory challenge. 83 In the United States
we have an extraordinarily diverse jury pool and thus the concerns
that the English had are very similar to our own.
80. David Zonana, Disciminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 255, 265-266 (1991).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 868.
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C. Not Only Are Peremptory Challenges Theoretically
Offensive, They Are Practically Inehficient Hurdles in an
Already Overburdened Judicial System
Peremptory challenges are expensive and time-consuming. Each
prospective juror must spend at least a day in court, be paid the
required fee, and lose the equivalent of productive work time. For
example, in the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin,
the average jury service is three days per service. '
The right to peremptory challenges was only exercised in
approximately 22 percent of all cases in England. However, the
Secretary of State for the Home Department's White Paper explains
one of the purposes for the abolition of peremptory challenges was to
"ensure that the court system and its related services operate as
efficiently and as effectively." '85 It is important to note that with only
22 percent of their cases involving peremptory challenges, England
still recognized that peremptory challenges create inefficiency in the
court system and that this problem could best be solved through their
abolition.
In a financially limited legal system, which the United States has,
the potential for racial discrimination becomes higher and higher.
This is an important argument based on the realities of the current
judicial climate for an end to peremptory challenges.
D. Improved Public Perception of the Verdict and Greater
Confidence in the Verdict Come With the Abolition of the
Peremptory Challenge System
When jury panels are more representative, the public will have
greater confidence in the verdicts they render and perceive the
verdicts as more just overall. In modern jury trials, extensive voir dire
and peremptory challenges are used in a strategic manner by lawyers
which often results in less qualified individuals on the juries. "These
trends are disturbing in that they arguably weaken the jury in its
ability to act as an accurate finder of fact." '
In England, according to the White Paper by the Attorney
84. Jury Duty General Information, www.wisc.edu/legal/juryduty.pdf.
85. Home Office, Criminal Justice: Plans for Legislation, 1986, CMND 9658, at 3
[hereinafter Home Office Command].
86. Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury:
Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 449 (1997).
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General, the same problems were present in their jury selection
process. The White Paper explained that the peremptory challenge
process became more of a "means of getting rid of jurors whose mere
appearance is thought to indicate a degree of insight or respect for the
law which is inimical to the interests of the defense.,
87
VI. Discussion of Criticisms
Some scholars, such as Neil Vidmar, argue that the differences in
the juror selection process and other juror procedures between the
United States and England are large enough to prevent the successful
abolition of peremptory challenges in the United States.' Vidmar
cites the differences in the procedure for challenges for cause and
cites the fact that the English system allows for majority verdicts
instead of the United States' requirement for unanimous decisions."
He sees these differences as being significant enough to make the
abolition of peremptory challenges in the United States less effective
than they are in England.90
However, the reality is that both countries were experiencing the
same problems with unequal minority representation and bias in
juries. England abolished the peremptory challenge to correct those
problems. Procedural differences do not remove the adverse
discriminatory effects of the peremptory system. In any jury system
that seeks to represent society and attempts to create a panel of peers,
peremptory challenges are inherently discriminatory. The fact that
unanimous decisions are not required in the United States should not
prevent abolishment because maintaining the challenge for cause
effectively eliminates outliers. However, the importance of
eliminating peremptory challenges from voir dire in the United States
may require consideration of abolishing the requirement for
unanimous jury decisions.91
In Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Cases. A Comparison of
Regulation in the United States, England and Canada, Judith Heinz
87. Home Office Command, supra note 85, at 15.
88. Forward, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1, 1, 4 (Spring 1999).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Abolishing the requirement of unanimity is beyond the scope of this
discussion, but there is certainly an argument that the entire process needs
reformation and that the peremptory challenge problem is simply the tip of the
iceberg.
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argues that, "[t]he English reason for abolition of peremptory
challenges, namely, crime control, is insufficient to support the
abolition of peremptory challenges." ' There are two relevant points
that should be addressed concerning her arguments.
First, the reason England abolished the peremptory challenge
was not merely to support crime control, but also to create a jury
selection system that was not biased and reflected a cross-section of
society in an increasingly diverse society. Her position also denies the
reality that the Crown's use of the standby was severely curtailed.
Heinz herself conceded that "[a]s a result, random selection now
forms most English juries." 93
Second, Heinz herself explains that the composition of a jury
failing to accurately represent a cross-section of the community is a
genuine concern of the American public.
If England sought to abolish peremptory challenges to more
fairly represent society in jury selection, and the American public is in
favor of this outcome, it seems like mirroring the English approach is
a reasonable option. On the other hand, Heinz advocates for the
United States to adopt the Canadian system, which gives an equal
number of peremptory challenges to both defense and the
prosecution. However, this call for reform does not address the
inherently discriminatory system and instead gives equal power to
both sides to discriminate. In the words of District Court Judge
Morris B. Hoffman, "[t]wo sets of partial jurors do not an impartial
jury make., 94
VII. Conclusion
The United States, not unlike England, has struggled with
finding a solution to the discriminatory realities of the largely lawyer
run jury selection process. Both systems began the same, but have
evolved in notably different ways. While courts in the United States
figured out ways to lessen the inherently discriminatory effects of
peremptory challenges, England has abolished the practice
altogether. Simple reforms to the use of peremptory challenges are
not only insufficient, but can even lead to an increased use of
discrimination in jury selection. Whether or not the English system
92. Heinz, supra note 73, at 217.
93. Id
94. Hoffman, supra note 75, at 865.
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should be the model for the system of jury selection in the United
States, a serious reconsideration of voir dire is urgently necessary.
